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Aristotle on Truth, Facts, and Relations:
Categories, De Interpretatione, Metaphysics Γ
Blake Hestir, TCU
1. Truth
Aristotle famously proclaims at Metaphysics G 7. 1011b26-7:
To men gar legein to on mê einai ê to mê on einai pseudos, to de to on einai kai
to mê on mê einai alêthes, ...
Aristotle is inclined to think of this as a definition of truth and falsehood;1 we are inclined
to wonder what he means by it. Perhaps a reasonable approximation in English would
amount to something like:
Tdf: For to state [of] that which is [that] it is not or [of] that which is not [that] it is
[is] false, and [to state of] that which is [that] it is and [of] that which is not [that]
it is not [is] true.
Many scholars2 think Tdf expresses the basic conception of a correspondence theory of
truth, and insofar as correspondence theories maintain that truth depends in some sense
on the world, Aristotle concurs. For him, truth depends on being, and presumably this
Met. G 7. 1011b25, 1012b7-11. See W.D. Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, ed. with intro. and comm.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924/1997), 284-5. This definition of truth is presumably one in a rough
sense, general enough to be acceptable to the opponent.
Perhaps Ammonius (On Aristotle’s On Interpretation 1-8, trans. by David Blank [Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press, 1996]) is the first to suggest such a view; see 21. 9-13, where he employs
‘schesei’ and ‘epharmosei’. In the contemporary world, see for example, J.L. Ackrill, trans. and notes,
Aristotle: Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963/1994); F. Brentano,
Über den Begriff der Wahrheit (1889), trans. as “On the Concept of Truth,” in The True and the Evident
(London: Routledge, 1966), 3-25; Charles Kahn, The Verb ‘To Be’ in Ancient Greek (Dordrecht: D. Reidel,
1973), 363; Terrence Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), secs. 2,
66, 69; Richard Kirkham, Theories of Truth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), ch. 4; Wolfgang Künne,
Conceptions of Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), ch. 3; Deborah Modrak, Aristotle’s Theory
of Language and Meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Kurt Pritzl, “Being True in
Aristotle’s Thinking,” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 14 (1998): 177201; W.D. Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen, 1923/1948); Jan Szaif, Platons Begriff der Warheit
(Freiberg-im-Breisgau: Verlag Karl Abner, 1996); cf. Szaif, “Die Geschichte des Warheitsbegriffs in der
klassichen Antike,” Die Geschichte des philosophischen begriffs der Warheit (Berlin and New Work:
Walter de Gruyter): 1-32; John Thorp, “Aristotle on Being and Truth,” De Philosophia 3 (1982): 1-9; Mark
Wheeler, “Semantics in Aristotle’s Organon,” Journal of the History of Philosophy XXXVII (1999): 191226, and “A Deflationary Reading of Aristotle’s Definitions of Truth and Falsehood at Metaphysics
1011b26-7,” forthcoming in Apeiron (his view is similar to the weaker correspondence as correlation
account); C.W.A. Whitaker, Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996). And most extensively among contemporary scholars, Paolo Crivelli (Aristotle on
Truth [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004], and “Aristotle on Signification and Truth,” A
Companion to Aristotle, Georgios Anagnostopoulos, ed., [West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009]: 81-100),
who has set a very high bar, “the height of which is not to be underestimated” (Christopher Shields, review
of Aristotle on Truth, Philosophical Review Vol. 119.2 [2010]: 243-6). On the other side, Richard
Campbell, Truth and Historicity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Marian David, Correspondence and
Disquotation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Donald Davidson, “The Folly of Trying to Define
Truth,” Journal of Philosophy Vol. XCIII 6 (1996): 263-78; Blake Hestir, “A ‘Conception’ of Truth in
Plato’s Sophist,” Journal of the History of Philosophy vol. 41.1 (2003): 1-24; Jonathan Barnes, Truth, Etc.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Cf. Fred Sommers, “On Concepts of Truth in Natural
Languages,” Review of Metaphysics 23 (1969): 259-86.
1
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condition places Aristotle in the correspondence camp. But there is room for an
alternative interpretation. Distinctions among correspondence theories generally revolve
around whether there be some entity in the world to which a truth corresponds, or whether
every truth have a truthmaker like a fact or a state of affairs that obtains (if there is such a
distinction), or whether truth requires a specific dependence relation between ontological
entities and true statements or thoughts, and if so what that relation amounts to.3 Stronger
versions of the correspondence view explain the relation in terms of congruence or
structural isomorphism between truthbearers and truthmakers; weaker versions maintain
that the relation is merely one of, say, correlation.4 Tdf taken within either the general
context of the discussion of truth or the context of Aristotle’s metaphysics, psychology,
and semantic theory does not require the additional explanatory features of
correspondence to fact.
2. Relation
Albeit compact, Tdf displays a number of interesting features. Aristotle claims that
a true statement states of that which is that it is. At face Tdf seems to make a nod towards
relation: stating something of something. However, the Greek is not so straightforward.
The verb legein here takes the accusative ‘to on’ with the negated infinitive ‘mê einai’.
So, the translation of the first part of Tdf amounts to something like “to state with respect
to that which is that it is not,” which is non-committal about relation, but this means that
stating of that which is that it is involves more than simply affirming some predicate of
some subject. Truth requires ontological combination (broadly construed), in addition to
noetic/lingustic combination. So, if Tdf is non-trival, it must be claiming not only that a
true statement affirms or denies something of something—a feature of any predicative
statement—but also that it states with respect to that which is (is not) (ontic level) that it
is (is not) (noetic/lingustic level). Perhaps this is an appropriate place to unpack the
magnifying glass and focus, cautiously, on ‘is’.
3. The Verb ‘To Be’ and Instantiation
Consider the story of Dr. Asclepius: Socrates says he’s heard a ghost, and he is
pale. Crito takes him to the doctor, who says he’s fine. Crito exclaims, “But Doc, look
how pale he is!” The doctor suggests Socrates should sit and have a drink.
Crito’s concern about the paleness in Socrates’ face illustrates a point about how
Aristotle tends to emphasize properties (universals) insofar as they are or hold of some
subject, especially in the case of predications beyond essential (cf. Met. Z 1. 1028a1531).
Crito suggests a way to understand the referent of ‘that which is’ (to on) in Tdf.
Much has been written on the proper interpretation of the verb ‘to be’. Generally

Correspondence is sometimes understood as agreement with reality. Aristotle hints in this direction at
Met. Q10 (“he whose thought is in a state contrary to the things is false,” epseustai ho enantiôs exôs ê ta
pragmata, 1051b4-5), though the comment is non-committal and is rather benign in context. Künne (2003)
comments, “Brentano invents a positive counterpart to this abbreviation, ‘being in agreement with things’
and then transfers if from persons to judgments. Thus he is able to connect Aristotle’s definition almost
seamlessly with the correspondence formula of much later centuries. This is the tradition Tarski defers to
when he declares again and again (much to Davidson’s annoyance) that he wants to remain faithful to
‘intentions which are contained in the so-called classical conception of truth (“true—agreeing with
reality”), 110-11. A. Tarski, “The Concept of Truth in the Languages of Deductive Science,” Collected
Papers, vol. IV (Basel/Boston/Stuttgart: Birkhäuser, 1986), 613-17.
See Kirkham (1992), ch. 4; Künne (2003), chs. 1-6.
3
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some think that ‘einai’ and its various forms can have different uses or meanings5
depending on context. A reasonably fine-grained set of distinctions is this: a complete use
is one in which there is no complement to the verb; an incomplete use is one in which the
verb has a complement. Those who think there are different senses for ‘to be’ between its
complete and incomplete uses claim that in its complete use ‘to be’ means “exists”
(existential), or “is true”/“is the case” (veridical) when the statement takes as its subject a
sentence or state of affairs. The incomplete ‘is’ can also have a number of different uses
I do not think that by itself ‘is’ has meaning in the same respect that ‘dog’ has meaning, at least as far as
meaning is cashed out in terms of signification, and I doubt Aristotle thought so either, though he does
place importance on being kath’ hauto and kata sumbebêkos (Met. D 7. 1017a7-8). But this is not to say
that it cannot be used in different ways (Met. Z 1. 1028a10) to express or emphasize different ways of
being. See for example Phys. I 3. 186a24-32, Met. D 7, E 2, 4. Call the tendency to locate the difference in
character between sentences in single ambiguous words like ‘is’ the “fallacy of the magnifying glass”
(R.M. Dancy, “Aristotle and Existence,” Synthese 54 (1983): 409-442, 424 ff; see also “Hintikka, Aristotle,
and Existence,” The Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka, ed. by R. Auxier and L. Hahn [Chicago and La Salle,
IL: Open Court, 2006], 311-28). The distinction between the ‘is’ of existence and the ‘is’ of predication
looks to be syntactical, not semantic. On the issue of existence, see further G.E.L. Owen, “Logic and
Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle,” in Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, ed. I.
Düring and G.E.L. Owen (Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1960), 163-90, 165; R.M. Dancy,
Sense and Contradiction: A Study in Aristotle (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1975), 127-31;
Myles Burnyeat, et al., Notes on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z (Oxford: Sub-faculty of Philosophy, 1979), 2;
Jaakko Hintikka, “The Varieties of Being in Aristotle,” in The Logic of Being: Historical Studies, ed. Simo
Knuuttila and Jaakko Hintikka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1986); Halper (1989), who claims
that “insofar as Aristotle has any concept of what later came to be called existence, it is his being as truth”
(223), and Halper (2009), 82. Christopher Kirwan, trans. with notes, Aristotle: Metaphysics Books G, D, E,
2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 214-17.
On the difference senses or uses of be and their relation, see also F. Brentano, On the Several
Senses of Being in Aristoteles, trans. by R. George (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1975); Charles Kahn, “The Greek Verb ‘To Be’ and the Concept of Being,” Foundations of Language 2
(1966): 245-65; esp. 249-52; “Some Philosophical Uses of ‘to be’ in Plato,” Phronesis vol. 26 (1981)
105134; more extensively, The Verb ‘Be’ in Ancient Greek (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1973); and a
summary in “A Return to the Theory of the Verb be and the Concept of Being,” Ancient Philosophy 24
(2004), 381-405. Kahn’s position is that copulative use supplies the foundation for a system of
interrelations between generally three uses: the copulative, existential, and veridical. The existential and
veridical uses make explicit what is implicit in the copulative use, and as such can be treated as secondorder semantic operators. See also Lesley Brown, “Being in the Sophist,” Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 4 (1986): 49-70; and Brown, “The Verb ‘to be’ in Greek Philosophy: Some Remarks,” in
Steven Everson, ed., Companions to Ancient Thought 3: Language (Cambridge University Press, 1994),
213.
A different line of interpretation (L.M de Rijk, Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology, Vol. 1
[Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill, 2002]) takes the primitive, focal meaning of ‘is’ to be something like “being
there”, which is something like the existential use but semantically more robust, having a connotative and
hyparctic (from ‘huparchein’, “to hold of”) or assertoric (like “is the case”) sense, 33 ff, 53ff, 197 ff. De
Rijk argues that “there is no reason to abandon the traditional view that the existential use of einai is the
central one, by which all others can reasonably be explained,” 30, and thinks that Ruijgh (C.J. Ruijgh,
Review of Kahn [1973] in Lingua, vol. 48 [1979]: 43-83; “Sur la valeur findamentale de einai: Une
réplique,” Mnemosyne, vol. 37 [1984], passim) has convincingly refuted Kahn’s main thesis that the
copulative use of ‘einai’ is central, sec. 2.4. To some extent my view remains non-committal on the
discussion of which ‘is’ is primitive, though my view is more-or-less consistent with those who take
Aristotle’s use of ‘is’ in the contexts I consider as most easily understood as somewhere within a
combination of various uses. See also de Rijk, 83, n. 23, on Kahn and on Matthen, 80-84. For response, see
Kahn (2004), 386. Also, the separate ‘being as truth’ issue is of secondary importance here. I treat it
elsewhere.
5
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including “is such and such” (copulative), “is the same as” (identity), “is enduring”
(temporal), and “is located in space” (locative).
Aristotle’s use of ‘to on’ and ‘einai’ in Tdf has been interpreted widely and
variously, but generally either as employing the existential, copulative, or veridical
use, or a combination of two or more.6
E. A true statement states of that which exists that it exists, and of that which does
not exist that it does not exist.
V. A true statement states of that which is the case that it is the case, and of that
which is not the case that it is not the case.
C. A true statement states of that which is P that it is P.
There are substantive and persuasive criticisms of each view. On purely philosophical
grounds, one can rule out E for two reasons. Plato offers a serious attempt to resolve the
problem of not being which Parmenides first wrestled in dactylic hexameter. Aristotle
knows this problem well (Phys. I 3, Met. N 2). If Aristotle were to mean by ‘that which is’
and ‘that which is not’ “what exists” and “what doesn’t exist,” he would face the difficult
problem of “absolute” non-being, and as a result those against whom Aristotle is
objecting would certainly have grounds for counter-objection. Second, if ‘to be’ is
understood existentially, the definition of truth will not be sufficiently general to cover all
types of statement. The account could handle ‘This parrot is not’ in the sense that he is no
more, but unable to handle all the variety of, say, predicative statements like ‘Socrates is
pale’, ‘Socrates is a man’, etc. And strictly speaking there is no naked existence for
Aristotle: particulars are insofar as they are something or other, and universals are insofar
as they hold of some subject or other—the world is ontologically G-rated.7 But this is not
to say that the ‘is’ in an expression such as ‘there is a man’ (Cat. 14b14, see also Cat.
13b19) should not be treated as if it were being used existentially—surely the syntactic
arrangement has that emphasis (note Aristophanes’ Clouds 367: “oud’ esti Zeus”).
Ontologically, though, things are different.8
One need not take these to be mutually exclusive possibilities. Brown (1994) and Kahn (1973), (1981),
(2004) have argued that there is no hard distinction between the existential, copulative, and veridical uses of
‘einai’. Wheeler (forthcoming Apeiron) rightly argues that Aristotle needs ‘to on’ and ‘einai’ to be taken in
the broadest scope possible to capture common usages, so the likely reading is a “comprehensive” use (see
Matthen [1983], 115 ff.; and Ross [1924/1997]), a combination of existential and copulative uses: to be is to
exist as something or other; so, on this view, Tdf = “To assert of what exists as an F that it does not exist as
an F, or of what does not exist as an F that it exists as an F, is false, while to assert of what exists as an F
that it exists as an F, and of what does not exist as an F that it does not exist as an F, is true.” Wheeler
claims one of the benefits of this reading is that it “doesn’t presuppose a particular ontological framework.”
I agree. Nevertheless I think Tdf must be read within the history of the discussion of being and not being, and
in conjunction with Aristotle’s struggle to locate what is substance most of all. In this respect, and in light of
the earlier works and Met. G, the quasi-copulative works better insofar as it captures the general way of
talking about truth independent of specific logical and ontological concerns. See also Owen, “Aristotle on
the Snares of Ontology” in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. R. Bambrough (London: Routledge and
Keegan Paul, 1965), 69-75; Allan Bäck, Aristotle’s Theory of Predication (Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill,
2000), who argues for the “aspect theory of predication,” 264 ff, according to which “every statement,
strictly speaking makes an assertion of existence, ... ‘Is’ then has a single sense, a structure that is both
existential and copulative: ‘existence with hooks’.”
See for example, Cat. 14a6-9, De Int. 19b19-30, Top. 103b27-39, Phys. 186a24-32. But the story is a bit
more involved: Met. G 2. 1003b5-10, D 7, Z 1. 1028a13-20, Q 10. 1051b33-a2.
I more or less side with Ross, Met. vol. I (1924/1997), 308, Dancy (1975), 208-9; Kirwan (1993), 214-5.
Cf. Whitaker (1996), ch. 2, and p. 136; Crivelli (2004) 100-25; Bostock, Aristotle: Metaphysics Z and H
6
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The veridical use gains support from Aristotle’s occasional tendency to treat
“things” (pragmata) or composites (suntheta) as facts or states of affairs, like white wood
and the incommensurability of the diagonal (Met. Q 10. 1051b20-1).9 But suppose after
returning from the beach, Socrates is not pale and I tell him that he is not pale. I speak the
truth: I have stated of that which is not that it is not. Treat ‘that which is not’ veridically.
The result is that a true statement states of that which is not the case that it is not the case.
However, we might ask, What’s not the case? Socrates’ not being pale? No, Socrates’ not
being pale is something that is the case; so, I would be speaking falsely: I state of what is
the case (it is the case that Socrates is not pale) that it is not case. And surely Aristotle
does not want to assert this. Second, if the veridical reading is correct, Tdf would claim that
every true statement would state of some state of affairs (like Socrates’ being pale) that is
the case that it is the case (i.e., “Socrates’ being pale is the case”), but statements rarely
have this structure.10 Third, if the expressions ‘to on’ and ‘einai’ are both taken
linguistically, then Tdf amounts to something like: “stating of ‘S is P’ is true that ‘S is P’ is
true,” etc. But then the statement becomes uninterestingly redundant.11 The veridical
reading will not do.
In the context of Metaphysics G, the copulative use looks more promising, though
the reading I defend is “quasi-copulative”—perhaps the ‘is’ of instantiation. The bulk of G
is dedicated to a discussion of the law of non-contradiction and a criticism of those,
including the Heracliteans and sophists, who Aristotle thinks are committed to denying the
law, but in G 7, with Anaxagoras on his mind, Aristotle turns to an ad hominem defense of
the law of excluded middle.12 The definition of truth and falsehood arises
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 49, 57. On being holôs, haplôs, see for example, Met. Z 1. 1028a30-1, but
in the case of existential statements regarding incomposites like universals, see Q 10. 1051b23-28, b33-a4.
Alan Code (“Aristotle and Existence,” forthcoming) has a promising account of how Aristotle explains the
existence of essential and non-essential attributes in terms of their ultimate grounding in primary
substances. See also, Frank Lewis Substance and Predication in Aristotle (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), 63-73.
On the veridical side, see Kirwan (1993), 117; Kahn (1973) 336 n. 7, 363, 367-8; and Kahn (2004), 391.
Crivelli (2004) opts for something like the veridical reading, but it turns on the notion of being as “being
true” which he applies to 1011b26-7. Crivelli, 46-50, argues that Aristotle recognizes only affirmative
states of affairs (though note Cat. 12b14-6; he thinks this does not support negative states of affairs). The
evidence derives from Met. Q 10. 1024b17-21, but I remain unconvinced, primarily because it is unclear to
me that Aristotle requires or even recognizes states of affairs (non-mental, non-linguistic objects of a
propositional nature [3-5]). On Crivelli’s view, the statements ‘Socrates is standing’ and ‘Socrates is not
standing’ are likenesses (in the sense of signification) of the same state of affairs, Socrates’ standing,
which if ‘Socrates is not standing’ is true, is not in the sense of being false (Crivelli [2009], 95). But
curiously as Aristotle presents it, the truth conditions for statements seem to bypass the Crivellian states of
affairs and refer directly to the combined or divided objects, and as on my interpretation, with emphasis on
the predicate expression. Crivelli may address the former issue; see 130 ff. Also, if Crivelli is right about
the distinction between about states of affairs and the objects (universals and individuals) involved, it
would seem to introduce new objects between noetic/linguistic entities and the world. Truth and falsehood
emerge at two levels: a) between the state of affairs and the objects, and b) between assertions/denials and
states of affairs. And if so, it seems to commit Aristotle to an ontology of universals, individuals, and
states of affairs, where states of affairs function as tertiary entities (some true, some false) that are at once
a truthbearers and truthmakers.
Künne (2004), 96. But cf. Crivelli (2004), 47-50, 130.
See Wheeler (Apeiron forthcoming).
Though Aristotle knows LNC is incapable of demonstration insofar as it is a first principle. Ross
(1924/1997), vol. I, 285.
9
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because Aristotle thinks it will make it clear why there cannot be any intermediate
property between two contradictories.
Consider the way Aristotle formulates the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) and
Law of Excluded Middle (LEM). At G 3. 1005b19-21, Aristotle says of LNC, “We have
next to state what this principle is”; then he states it:
LNC: [For] the same thing to hold (huparchein) good and not to hold good
simultaneously of the same [thing] and in the same respect is impossible. The
statement of LEM comes at G 7. 1011b23-24:
LEM: It is impossible that there be anything between a contradiction, but it is
necessary either to assert or deny any one [thing] of another.13
Supposing a comfortable shift between formulations of the laws in terms of particulars
and universals, on the one hand, and linguistic subjects and predicate expressions, on the
other, Aristotle tends to emphasize the properties insofar as they hold of, or regarding
linguistic predicates that they are asserted or denied of, some subject (‘Socrates is pale’
asserts that being pale belongs to Socrates). In the case of both LNC and LEM, there is
an emphasis on the predicate expression, but insofar as it indicates that a property is (or
is not) in the case of a subject. So for instance, one can assert being pale in the case of
Socrates and not being pale in the case of Socrates, but LNC does not permit claiming
that being pale and not being pale hold of Socrates at the same time and in the same
respect, and LEM claims it is necessary that one can either assert being pale of Socrates
or deny being pale of Socrates (i.e., assert not being pale of Socrates).
Aristotle’s emphasis on properties insofar as they belong or not to a subject, or on
predicate expressions insofar as they are asserted or denied of a subject suggests a
plausible reason why Aristotle has a version of copulative use in mind when formulating
his definition of truth and falsehood. If it is necessary to assert or deny any one thing of
another, and what he means by this is that it is necessary that one can assert or deny any
property of some subject, one thing Crito can assert truly about Socrates is being pale,
since being pale really holds of Socrates.
Although this tendency reaches as far back as the Categories and De
Interpretatione, this emphasis on the predicate expression is supported in G. Here are
three cases:
I. Met. G 4. 1006b34: Consequently it is not possible that it should be
simultaneously true to say of the same thing (to auto) [i.e., the subject] that it is a
man and is not a man.
Here the copulative use of ‘einai’ with the emphasis placed firmly on the predicate
insofar as it is or is not with respect to the subject is pretty clear: “to be a man” and “not
to be a man” are not the sort of things we can state of the same subject.
II. Met. G 4. 1007b23-24: For if a man [i.e., a general subject] is thought by
someone not to be a warship, it is plain that he is not a warship; so that he also is
[i.e., in the sense that he is a warship], if the contradiction is really true.
Here the emphasis is on the subject expression insofar as some property is being asserted
(or in this case “thought”) and denied of it, and a copulative reading of ‘einai’ and ‘esti’
provides the best sense of the passage.14
Note that there is a subtle difference in the way Aristotle expresses the laws. See P. Gottlieb, “The
Principle of Non-Contradiction and Protagoras,” Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy VIII
(1994), 183-209.
13
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III. Met. G 4. 1007b32-33: I mean for instance that if it is true to say of a man that
he is not a man, plainly he is also either a warship or not a warship. So if the
affirmation holds good of him, necessarily its denial does, too.
The third passage combines subject and property. What is accomplished when the
statement that ‘Socrates is a man’ is true is successfully stating of the actual Socrates that
he is a man,15 though ultimately what ‘is a man’ signifies is the particular instantiation of
man in the case of Socrates.
Formulate the general assumption Aristotle makes about the “bi-directionality” of
being (BD) this way:
BD: For any subject S and universal P, one way for S to be and one way for P to
be is for S to be P.
BDn: For any S and P, one way for S not to be and one way for P not to be is for S
not to be P.
Supposing that Aristotle accepts BD and BDn,16 the copulative interpretation of ‘that
which is’ and ‘that it is’ would follow these principles (‘B’ = Being):
B1: ‘That which is’ can refer to any S when, for some P, S is P.
B2: ‘That which is’ can refer to any P when for some S, P is with respect to
S.17 Moreover, the B principle can apply to the expression ‘that it is’ (einai) as well:
B1: ‘that it is’ can refer to any S when for some P, it is stated that S is P.
B2: ‘that it is’ can refer to any property P when for some s, it is stated that P is
with respect to S (in other words, that s is P).
Given this way of interpreting the text, the expressions ‘that which is’ and ‘that it
is’ may refer directly to the subjects and properties insofar as they are in the case of the
other. This quasi-copulative reading of the verb ‘to be’—the ‘is’ of instantiation—is not
exactly as straight-forward as that expressed in C, or even in the comprehensive
combination of E and C. Stating of that which is that it is need not necessarily mean that
one states of that which is P that it is P: ‘that which is’ and ‘that it is’ can refer either to
real-world subjects and universals as if they in their particular instance of being were
fragmented from that to which they adhere.18 The idea underwrites the significance of
claims such as: “for when a man is healthy, then also health is ...” (Met. L 3. 1070a22-4;
see too, Cat. 14a6-10, Met. G 2. 1003b5-10, Z 1. 1028a13-20), while at the same time
capturing the additional condition expressed by claims such as, “it is because the thing
[here, “particular”] is or is not that the statement is said to be true or false” (Cat. 4b8-9).

Cf. Met. G 5. 1009a7-8, b4, 1010b22.
Cf. Met. G 4. 1008a19-30, b30-33, G 5. 1010b14-18.
Here I see compatibility with Code (forthcoming), and Lewis (1991), 69.
This works for “not being” as well, and linguistic employment of B1-2. For additional textual support,
see De Int. 10; in particular, De Int. 19b13-30.
Generally this notion of being in the case of something can be traced back at least to Plato’s Sophist. See
Michael Frede, “Plato’s Sophist on false statements,” in Richard Kraut, ed., The Cambridge Companion to
Plato (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 420; and see further, Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage,
Hypomnemata 18 (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1967), 57-58. More frequently Aristotle employs
the expressions ‘holds of’, ‘belongs to’ ‘predicated of’ (understood ontologically), which are used
analogously to ‘being said of’ at linguistic level. In some cases, to hold of or to be predicated of looks like
the relation of being. See S. Bobizen, “The Development of Modus Ponens in Antiquity: From Aristotle to
the 2nd Century AD,” Phronesis 47, 359-94, esp. 372-3; cf. Crivelli (2004), 133, n. 18.
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The beauty of such an interpretation is (1) it avoids the pitfalls of having to read
the verb ‘to be’ with any particular sense in mind, though it emphasizes the more
primitive copulative use of the verb while at the same time embodying the existential
sense, (2) it fits nicely with the discussion of being and not being that precedes G 7, (3) it
illuminates to some extent what Aristotle means by combination, broadly construed, (4)
it fits well within the discussion of particulars and universals presented alongside truth in
the Categories and De Interpretatione, (5) it is consistent with and perhaps even
motivated by the Posterior Analytics claim that “perception is of the universal—e.g. of
man but not of Callias the man)” (APo. 100a16-b1) and subsequently Aristotle’s
commitment to the central explanatory role of universals, and finally (6) it makes sense
within the development of Aristotle’s conception of substance, particularly in the
Metaphysics where Aristotle struggles to locate primary substance (what can be subject
and form, see for example Met. D 8. 1017b10-26, Z 3. 1028b34 ff, Z 6, Z 11. 1037a21b7, Z 13. 1038b2-6, H 1. 1042a12-15, 26-31).19 Perhaps Crito was prescient.
4. Truth and the Facts, Funny or Otherwise
If truth requires the existence of a truthmaker like a fact or state of affairs, then
one might claim that Aristotle has a correspondence theory of truth since he seems to
treat combinations like Socrates’ being pale and the incommensurability of the diagonal
as “things” or “pragmata.” LSJ lists a good number of different uses of ‘pragma’,
including fact, matter, affair, activity, circumstance, trouble, and annoyance. Sometimes
‘pragma’ means plain old “object” or “thing.” Both Plato and Aristotle are rarely clear
about what constitutes a pragma, though there is good evidence for thinking that—
depending on the context—they mean something either like a particular circumstance or,
loosely speaking, a state of affairs, or some entity like a form, species, universal,
substance, or particular.
One striking passage involving ‘pragma’ is Categories 14b11-22, where Aristotle
claims,
For of things which reciprocate as to implication of being (tôn gar
antistrephontôn kata tên tou einai akolouthêsin), that which is in some way
(hopôsoun) the cause (to aition) of the other’s being (tou einai)20 might
The latter two points are particularly helpful to remember when thinking about how Aristotle might deal
with the truth conditions for existential statements. Also, one important issue that is beyond the scope of this
paper but part of the larger project is that Met. D 8 and the opening of Z paint Aristotle’s trouble with
locating primary substance. For example, paleness is in the case of Socrates, but Socrates, a combination of
form and matter, is because he is a man. In other words, paleness is instantiated in the case of an
instantiation of man. In this respect, it is difficult to determine what exactly it is that constitutes the subject
as Aristotle struggles with the subject criterion of substantiality established in the Categories and modified
in Metaphysics Z. So, whether an essential predication expresses an actual combination of subject and
predicate poses a real challenge, but certainly there is a distinction between referring to the essence as such
and the essence as instantiated (I) in cases I1 – In. This may lend a bit more support for my reading, since the
logical structure of subject-predicate expressions need not precisely reflect conditions at the ontic level,
even when such statements are true.
What sort of being might this be? Line b20 picks out being true. So, in this respect, Aristotle is
specifying an ontological condition for being true. This would place him in line with Met. D 7. 1017a31-2, G
10. 1051b1-5, and 1051b33-5. Crivelli (2004) takes the G 10 passages in support of the states of affairs
view, and subsequently takes the specification at Cat. 14b15 that the species man is as meaning that the
19
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reasonably be called prior by nature. And that there are some such cases is clear.
For there being a man (to gar einai anthrôpon) reciprocates as to implication of
being with the true statement about it (peri autou): if there is a man (ei gar estin
anthrôpos), the statement whereby we say that there is a man (hoti estin
anthrôpos) is true, and reciprocally (kai antistrephei ge)—since if the statement
whereby we say that there is a man is true, there is a man. And whereas the true
statement is in no way the cause of the thing’s being (oudamôs aitios tou einai to
pragma), the thing (to pragma) does seem in some way (pôs) the cause (aition) of
the statement’s being true; it is because the actual thing is or [is] not (tôi gar einai
to pragma ê mê) that the statement is called true or false.
The example is an existential claim: ‘There is a man’.21 Whatever the pragma is that is
the condition for the truth of ‘there is a man’ involves the universal man. Is pragma a
simple fact? Unlikely since he doesn’t specify the use of the word in this way, though he
occasionally slips into this way of speaking.22 It is more plausible that a pragma is
something like a state of affairs. But read in the context of the Categories and De
Interpretatione it is difficult to justify reading it this way since Aristotle tends to use
‘pragma’ to emphasize either the universal that the predicate expresses or the
particular(s) that the subject term expresses. For example, Aristotle claims,
Now of the things (tôn pragmatôn) some are universal (katholou), others
particular (kath’ hekaston) (I call universal that which is by its very nature
(pephuke) predicated of a number of [things], and particular that which is not;
man, for instance, is a universal, Callias a particular). (De Int. 17a38-b1)
Here ‘pragma’ refers either to the universal or particular. But he also claims, With
contraries it is not necessary if one is (êi) for the other to be (einai) too. For if
everyone were well health would be (estai) but not sickness, and if everything
were white whiteness would be (estai) but not blackness. Further, if Socrates’
being well is contrary to Socrates’ being sick, and it is not possible for both
(amphotera) to hold (huparchein) at the same time of the same person (tôi autôi),
it would not be possible if one of the contraries were for the other to be too; if
Socrates’s being well were Socrates’s being sick would not. (Cat. 14a6-14)
Here the emphasis of being is on the instantiated universals health/sickness,
whiteness/blackness, rather than whiteness, etc., generally or the particular Socrates.
Although ‘tou Sôkratê hugiainein’ (‘Socrates’s being well’) suggests that Aristotle is
referring to the state of affairs Socrates’-being-well, the referent of ‘amphotera’ at a12
taken in conjunction with ‘tôi autôi’ is likely the being well and being sick referenced in
species man is in the sense of being true, and so this passage is evidence for and consistent with the states
of affairs view. I do not; see notes 63 and 75.
This existential claim need not express an incomposite, but it can. I take it that given the context, Aristotle
is using this statement to express a general point about priority with respect to truth. So, ‘there is a man’
could be read as elliptical for ‘Crito is a man’ or ‘Socrates is pale’, in which case ‘there is a man’ signifies
the instantiated universal man, or as the strongly existential ‘Man is’. Cf. Crivelli (2004), ch. 3; Whitaker
(1996), 135-7; Owen (1965), sec. III. Crivelli takes it that the pragma in question is the same as the “autou”
in b15, which is correct, and on his interpretation pragmata can be composites in the form of a state of
affairs or incomposites. On my interpretation argued for below, the pragma can be either the universal taken
as such, the instantiated universal, or, in the case of assertions of the form S is P, the particular. Here it is
likely the instantiated universal, but could also represent the universal as such.
Crivelli (2004), 130, cites APr. 2.15. 64b10, GC 1.8. 325a18, Phys. 8.8. 263a17, Met. A 3. 984a18. Cf.
Pritzl (1998), 183-4.
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the previous line. So here Aristotle is emphasizing the universal insofar as it is
instantiated in the particular, Socrates, like Socrates’ untreatable paleness.23 Other times
the subject is emphasized (Cat. 13b12-19; see also Cat. 4b8-9, Top. II 109a27). But in
neither case does Aristotle treat pragma as a fact or state of affairs.
Although there are other passages that employ ‘pragma’ in less precise ways (for
example, Cat. 12b5-16) and some passages that more strongly suggest treating pragma as
states of affairs, really the issue is whether Tdf requires some truthmaker like a fact or state
of affairs that obtains.24 But the texts do not support that it does. Aristotle thinks that truth
depends on being and not being, and this being resides in a property’s being or not being
in the case of some subject.
5. Asymmetrical Relations and Truth Making
The reasons for attributing a correspondence conception to Aristotle are
diminished in light of the above considerations, though Categories 14b11-22 again raises
concerns about whether Aristotle thinks truth is explained in terms of some sort of
relation between noetic/linguistic entities and ontological combinations and separations.
The word “cause” (aition) suggests as much, though note that Aristotle is emphatically
hesitant to commit himself to the strict sense of cause when he qualifies by claiming that
the pragma is a cause “in some way” (hopôsoun, b12), and reiterates the point at b20
(pôs).25 Conceivably Aristotle thinks of a pragma as being a loose explanation of truth,
rather than as a causal or definitional explanation, and his referencing it merely reveals
his realist commitments (see Met. Q 10. 1051b6-9).26 Perhaps more to the point, this
“causal” dependency could be taken against the background of his semantic views. Since
meaning is tied to the world via the route explicated in section 2 above, when Aristotle
claims that a statement is true because of entities in the world—in other words, that a
statement is true in virtue of something else—his point is a consequence of his semantic
theory: truth depends on the world because meaning does. However, such “worldly” ties
need not explain truth per se; ultimately as far as Aristotle is concerned, there are
background semantic and ontological conditions necessary for the possibility of truth.
‘Truth making’, then, as I use it, indicates nothing more than that truth depends on the
world, and not that truth is defined by a truth-making relation.
Another reason not to think that Aristotle considers truth to be a relation is that he
does not treat the truth predicate in the same way he treats other predications, particularly
pros ti predications. For example, at Categories 4a29-b13 Aristotle claims that “in the case
of substances it is by themselves changing that they are able to receive contraries,”
whereas statements like ‘Socrates is sitting’ are “completely unchangeable in every way.”
As for truth, it is because of a change in Socrates, the pragma, that ‘Socrates is sitting’
becomes true then false. So, the shift in predicates true, false as applied to statements
indicates no change in what they are predicated of. ‘True’ and ‘false’ operate differently
See also Top. II. 109a27-33.
Künne (2003), 96, n. 17, and P. Geach, “Aristotle on Conjunctive Propositions,” Logic Matters (Oxford:
Blackwell Pub, 1992), 21.
Moreover, in whatever way the pragma is the cause, ‘pragma’ refers in pertinent contexts to either the
subject or universal, though in light of the B-principles this option is not mutually exclusive (see Cat. 4b810, 12b12-16).
Cf. Irwin (1988), 269 and sec. 2. Künne (2003) offers an interesting discussion of Aristotle in the context
of a consideration of the association of truth making correspondence relation; see ch. 3.5, particularly secs.
3.5.1-3.
23

24

25

26

SAGP NL Pacific 2011 p. 15

from other predicates, including relatives. One might call them second order,27 and nonrelational.
6. Conclusion
So, back to Tdf. In the context of G, Aristotle is engaged in dialectic. Aristotle
appeals to a formula for truth that expresses minimal conditions for a statement or thought
to be true or false.28 Since Aristotle need not initially specify semantic or ontological
conditions, Tdf by itself is general enough to be non-question-begging and so acceptable to
those dialectically engaged. But presumably his position is that to be capable of
formulating true or false assertion—and in particular, of engaging in science— certain
more substantive ontological and semantic conditions are necessary. In this respect, his
strategy is similar to Plato’s strategy against the lovers of sights and sounds in Republic
V.29 The lovers of sights and sounds need not (and don’t) commit themselves to a world
of forms, only to the claim that knowledge is set over that which is in every way, while
belief is set over that which is and is not. Only later does Plato reveal what that which is
in every way must really be about.
But Aristotle’s own understanding of Tdf is robust. On my interpretation, his view
is this:
Tdf-I: For to state of that universal P which is in the case of some subject S that P
is not in the case of S is false, and to state of that P which is in the case of S that
it is in the case of S and of that P which is not in the case of S that it is not of S is
true.
This conception brings him closer to Plato. Plato’s a realist, too. Aristotle prefers to keep
his being immanent, but in some sense form takes on ontological primacy. My view is
that even after Aristotle’s central ontology, psychology, and semantics are in place, his
particular conception of truth remains free of the hallmarks of the correspondence theory
of truth and retains a minimalist character.30
There are reasons for thinking Aristotle would not have appealed to them.
Statements have a particular syntactical structure and their components acquire semantic
content from functioning as symbols for the components of thoughts, though statements
themselves can be legitimate bearers of meaning and truth via their functional dependency
on thought. [I discuss this point in the longer version of the paper.] The components of
thought are likenesses of universals accessed via a complicated perceptual mechanism. But
for Aristotle complex thoughts (unlike thoughts of incomposites like essences where truth
is something like contact [or identity] with no possibility of falsehood) are functionally and
structurally unlike the world in that they exhibit intentionality and syntactic structure (a
“deep syntactic structure”). Their structure is in some sense dependent on language
(insofar as it is a natural product of our rational capacity). In the case of true assertions,
their structure does not require isomorphism or agreement with what they are about
because of the unique structural nature of thoughts and statements. Moreover, Aristotle
does not treat the truth predicate as expressing some relation between noetic-linguistic and
ontic items. Nor does Aristotle require that there be some fact or state of affairs that
obtains to function as truthmaker. Aristotle’s
27
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See Wheeler (forthcoming).
Crivelli (2003), 260, lists nine assumptions that the definition of truth relies on.
And perhaps more importantly, the Protagoreans and Heracliteans in the Theaetetus.
Though not deflationary. Cf. Wheeler (Apeiron forthcoming). See Alston, RCT, chs. 1-2.
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conception of truth merely requires that some universal be instantiated (or not) in the
case of a subject, and given Aristotle’s shift in conception of primary substance by the
time of the Metaphysics, combination at the ontic level looks quite different from what it
did in the Categories. Truthmaking resides in the immanent universal, the primary locus
of being for Aristotle.
At De Interpretatione 18a39-b2, Aristotle claims, “For if it is true to say that it is
white or it is not white, [it is] necessary that it is white or not white, and if it is white or
not white, then it was true to say or deny this.” Aristotle’s conception of truth looks like
this:
TA-Schema: ‘S is P’ is true ↔ S is P.
TA-Schema(n): ‘S is not P’ is true ↔ S is not P.
By Tdf Aristotle need only mean that stating with respect to some property P that is in the
case some subject S that P is in the case of S, is what amounts to truth. More precisely
then for Aristotle the TA-Schema would amount to:
TA-Schema*: ‘S is P’ is true ↔ the universal P is instantiated in the case of S. TASchema( ) : ‘S is not P’ is true ↔ the universal P is not instantiated in the case of
S.31
Does this conception of truth require correspondence? Some are inclined to think so. That
is fine, as long as we understand in what respect.
n
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Cf. Künne (2003), 100.

